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Abstract: 
Using a new dataset encompassing more than 2,200 inventions made by Max Planck Society 
researchers from 1980 to 2004, we explore how licensee and technology characteristics affect 
the licensing and commercialization of technologies from public research. We find no 
evidence that spin-offs and external licensees systematically differ in their likelihood of 
successful commercialization. Technologies licensed to foreign firms are less often 
commercialized, which may reflect selection effects. Patented technologies and inventions by 
senior scientists are more likely to be licensed, but patent protection is related to lower 
commercialization odds and lower royalty payments.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Throughout the developed economies, public attention and policy measures are increasingly 
focusing on the transfer of knowledge from public research to the private sector. Following 
the Bayh-Dole Act in the U.S. and similar legislative changes elsewhere, technology transfer 
has generally been accepted as a primary objective of universities and other public research 
organizations (cf. Mowery et al, 2001; Phan and Siegel, 2006; Verspagen, 2006). 
Notwithstanding the importance of alternative transfer channels (Bozeman, 2000; Cohen et 
al., 2002; Zellner, 2003), commercialization of scientific results based on patents, licensing, 
and spin-off entrepreneurship has found particularly intensive scrutiny (Jensen and Thursby, 
2001; Shane, 2002; Lowe and Ziedonis, 2006). Yet in spite of the increased emphasis on the 
protection of universities’ intellectual property rights (IPRs) and IPR-based 
commercialization, we still know little about the underlying processes of knowledge transfer. 
To learn more about these processes, in the present paper we explore how the success of 
commercialization activities is related to several licensee and technology characteristics.  
Commercializing university inventions is non-trivial because these inventions are 
often far from being readily marketable. Prior work suggests that the commercialization of 
results from public research is complicated by uncertainty stemming from the early-stage 
character of most university inventions (Jensen and Thursby, 2001), information asymmetries 
between inventor and potential licensee (Shane, 2002), as well as the non-codified nature of 
important elements of the knowledge base underlying the traded technology (Agrawal, 2006). 
However, we lack conclusive evidence on how the challenges posed by these traits of 
university inventions are related to licensee and technology characteristics. For example, the 
relative commercialization performance of university spin-offs vis-à-vis external licensees is a 
contested issue (Shane, 2002; Lowe and Ziedonis, 2006). Other issues, including the 
effectiveness of international licensing, as well as the relationships between different forms of 
university-industry interaction such as collaborative research and technology licensing, are 
largely unexplored. Furthermore, most empirical studies are based on U.S. data, and it cannot 
be taken for granted that their results generalize to other countries and institutional settings.  
We begin to address these issues using a newly assembled dataset with detailed 
information about the licensing activities of the Max Planck Society, Germany’s largest non-
university public research organization dedicated to basic science. Unlike German 
universities, the Max Planck Society has consistently been subject to a Bayh-Dole-like IPR 
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regime since the 1970s. This enables us to draw on a rich set of inventions and licensing 
activities, which encompasses more than 2,200 inventions and about 700 license agreements 
involving royalty payments for the time period 1980-2004. In addition to licensing 
agreements and inventor information, the data also contain information on royalty payments, 
indicating whether or not the technology was successfully commercialized in the marketplace 
as well as the magnitude of the returns from commercialization to the Max Planck Society. 
We use this dataset to analyze how licensing and commercialization are affected by 
differences across licensees and technologies that can be expected to affect how pervasive 
information asymmetries and problems of knowledge transfer are for a particular invention. 
Specifically, we study licensing across national boundaries as well as spin-off versus external 
licensees. While less relevant in the U.S. context, licensing to foreign firms is a pertinent 
issue in the smaller and more open European economies, which has received little prior 
attention in prior research. We also contribute new evidence to the unresolved issue of how 
effective inventor spin-offs are as commercializers of technologies from public research. 
Second, we investigate the effects of technology characteristics on the effectiveness of 
license-based technology transfer. In this context, we focus on the role of patent protection, 
inventor seniority and collaborative research. We use both the incidence and the level of 
royalties as measures of successful commercialization, also taking into consideration that non-
random selection into licensing by different types of licensees may affect commercialization 
outcomes. 
Our analysis indicates that even though information asymmetries and the difficulty of 
transferring non-codified knowledge are critical in shaping the success of license-based 
technology transfer from public research, they cannot fully explain the empirical patterns. 
Technologies licensed to foreign firms are less often commercialized, but this may reflect 
selection effects. Inventor spin-offs are no less successful in commercializing academic 
inventions than established firms even though they presumably are less well endowed with 
capabilities and complementary assets. Inventor seniority enhances the chances of 
technologies to be licensed, as does the presence and scope of patent protection. In contrast, 
patented inventions are less likely to yield successful commercial products. Overall, we find 
that with the exception of licensing to spin-offs, both the likelihood of finding a licensee and 
the likelihood of successful commercialization have fallen over the 25-year period under 
investigation. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses how information 
asymmetry and knowledge transfer are relevant for license-based technology transfer from 
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public research. In section 3, testable hypotheses about the effects of licensee and technology 
characteristics on licensing and successful commercialization are derived from the theoretical 
discussion. Section 4 provides background information on the technology transfer activities of 
the Max Planck Society, while section 5 describes the data and methodology of the empirical 
analysis. Results are presented in section 6 and discussed in section 7. 
 
2. Technology transfer through licensing of academic inventions 
 
Inventions by scientists in public research often provide the foundations of commercially 
viable innovations. Some academic inventions are made as joint products of research 
activities (think of instrumentation or lab equipment first used for the researcher’s own use). 
In other cases, research results can both be published in a scientific journal and applied 
commercially (for example, “patent-paper pairs” related to the same findings are widespread 
in the life sciences; cf. Murray and Stern, 2007). In the Bayh-Dole-like institutional setting 
that is increasingly adopted also outside the U.S. (Lissoni et al., 2008) academic inventions 
have to be disclosed to the scientist’s employer and become its property. If they are to be used 
for commercial purposes, prospective innovators have to obtain a license, even if they are 
identical to the original inventors. Most universities and public research organizations have 
established technology transfer offices (TTOs) that organize the protection of their IPRs and 
actively market their inventions. 
 Not only are academic inventions directly linked to current science, they also tend to 
be at an early stage of development. The technology to be commercialized has often not 
advanced beyond the proof-of-concept or prototype stage (Jensen and Thursby, 2001). 
Accordingly, licensees need to engage in substantial further development efforts to obtain a 
marketable product. Successful commercialization often hinges on the continued involvement 
of the academic inventor (Agrawal, 2006). The combination of being science-based and early-
stage gives rise to at least three kinds of difficulties for the licensing and commercialization 
process: uncertainty, information asymmetry, and the need to transfer uncodified knowledge. 
 Like all inventions, university technologies cannot always be turned into successful 
products in the marketplace. Potential innovators obtaining licenses for technologies from 
public research face substantial uncertainty as to whether (i) they will be able to develop a 
functioning product, (ii) they will do so faster than potential competitors, and (iii) the product 
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will be sufficiently successful with customers to justify the costs of licensing and 
development. 
 Problems of asymmetric information further complicate innovation activities based on 
technology transfer from public research (Gallini and Wright, 1990). As opposed to 
technologies developed in-house, potential licensees of academic inventions lack in-depth 
knowledge of the underlying research. This limits their ability to evaluate the 
commercialization prospects of the invention. At the same time, licensees typically have 
better knowledge of the markets for the prospective products than the inventor or the TTO 
representing her. To some degree, these problems of asymmetric information can be reflected 
in the design of licensing agreements and the payment schemes they provide for (Jensen and 
Thursby, 2001; Lowe, 2006). Effective IPRs, reputation, and trust based on prior 
collaboration and/or cultural proximity may further help overcome problems stemming from 
asymmetric information (cf., e.g., Granovetter, 1985; Shane and Stuart, 2002; Mora-Valentin 
et al., 2004). However, there is no guarantee that a licensing agreement can be concluded 
successfully in the presence of substantial asymmetric information. Typically, at best a few 
potential licensees exist for a particular technology, and licensing is based on small-numbers 
bargaining.   
 Asymmetric information arises as a problem in negotiating licensing agreements 
because both parties have incentives to withhold information, as this may increase their share 
in future innovation rents. However, even if both parties faithfully try to share their 
knowledge (for example, after a licensing agreement providing for sales-based royalties is 
entered into so that inventors have an interest in successful commercialization), substantial 
obstacles in communicating this knowledge typically have to be overcome. They derive from 
the nature of the relevant knowledge, which tends to be complex and imperfectly codified.  
Agrawal (2006) argues that academic inventions often draw on multiple fields of 
knowledge. Potential licensees are unlikely to have substantial prior knowledge in all these 
fields. Accordingly, their absorptive capacities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) may be 
insufficient to fully understand information related to the invention, even if the inventor 
and/or the TTO disclose all their knowledge. In addition, relevant elements of that knowledge 
may be non-codified (even if they would in principle be codifiable; in which case they can be 
characterized as “latent” (Agrawal, 2006; cf. also Cowan and Foray, 1997)). For example, 
knowledge that the inventor gained from failed and therefore unreported experiments may 
frequently be inaccessible for an external licensee. Engaging the inventor in the further 
development process after concluding a licensing agreement may enable the licensee to draw 
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on the inventor’s non-codified knowledge (Agrawal, 2006). Whether inventor engagement is 
feasible and effective will depend on the inventor’s willingness to cooperate as well as the 
quality and scope of her non-codified knowledge. The inventor’s willingness to cooperate 
may in turn depend on the proximity, familiarity and type of the licensee.   
 The potential impact of licensee characteristics on the chances of successful 
commercialization clearly goes beyond their ability to secure the inventor’s support. Firms 
differ in their dynamic capabilities of integrating new technologies, which derive from the 
firms’ prior activities and competences (Teece et al., 1997). Particularly in younger and 
smaller firms, capabilities may also be critically affected by the pre-entry experience of the 
founder(s) as well as key employees (Helfat and Lieberman, 2002). In the present context, 
there may be substantial differences in the kind and richness of capabilities possessed by 
external licensees, which are typically established firms active in a variety of markets related 
to the licensed technology, relative to inventor spin-offs that tend to be younger and smaller, 
but also more intimately familiar with the scientific background of the licensed invention. In 
addition, external licensees are more likely to command substantial under-utilized 
complementary assets enabling them to benefit from innovation (Teece, 1986). They are also 
more likely to license inventions for primarily strategic reasons, i.e. to block competitors from 
the access to the underlying technology or to enhance their negotiation position in contexts of 
“patent thickets” (Shapiro, 2000).  
 While some degree of uncertainty about innovative success is irreducible, information 
asymmetries and communication problems in knowledge transfer are not equally pronounced 
in all technology licensing and commercialization. We expect them to vary across types of 
licensees as well as characteristics of the inventions. In the next section we derive hypotheses 
addressing these differences. The hypotheses are then tested empirically.  
 
3. Hypotheses  
 
Both information asymmetries and problems of knowledge transfer can be expected to vary 
with the cognitive “distance” (Nooteboom, 1999) between licensor (the academic inventor 
represented by her employer’s TTO) and licensee. This distance is plausibly related to 
observable characteristics of both the licensee and the technology, which may therefore affect 
the likelihood that a licensing agreement is concluded and, if so, the invention is successfully 
commercialized.  
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3.1 Likelihood of licensing  
We consider differences in the nature of licensees along two dimensions: domestic versus 
foreign licensees, and inventor spin-offs versus external licensees. As regards the first 
dichotomy, information asymmetries are expected to be more pronounced in licensing 
negotiations across national boundaries. Information is harder to obtain for foreign licensees, 
particularly if they do not come from countries speaking the same language, and the design 
and monitoring of contracts is more difficult internationally. In addition, patents on the target 
technology may not have been obtained in the county of the potential foreign licensee, 
exposing it to an enhanced risk of imitation by competitors. In contrast, information 
asymmetry is minimized if a technology is licensed to a spin-off organized by its inventor(s).  
The additional complications faced in licensing negotiations with foreign firms (as 
compared to domestic firms) and external licensees (as compared to inventor spin-offs) may 
be mitigated by characteristics of the technology to be licensed. Our data allow us to 
investigate three aspects of the technology: the presence and scope of patent applications 
related to the invention, the seniority of the inventor(s) affecting their reputation and possibly 
the quality of the invention, as well as whether or a technology is based on prior collaborative 
research between the inventor(s) and a private-sector firm.  
 Patents related to an academic invention provide a strong signal that the invented 
technology conforms to a given standard of novelty, usefulness and non-obviousness. This 
should enhance the likelihood that a technology is licensed. The value of this signal is 
expected to be larger when information asymmetry is more pronounced. Given the above 
considerations, we conjecture that this is the case for foreign licensees (compared to domestic 
ones) as well as for external licensees (compared to inventor spin-offs). The latter conjecture 
is in line with previous arguments suggesting that spin-off licensing might be a solution of 
last resort when attempts to find an external licensee have failed (Shane, 2002). Spin-off 
licensing would then be expected particularly when IPR protection is weak. Finally, patents 
enhance the strategic value of a technology in blocking competitors’ market access or in 
negotiating access to complementary technologies, which presumably is more relevant to 
external licensees already active in related markets.  
Following this line of reasoning, we conjecture the following relationship between 
patents and the likelihood of licensing a technology to different types of licensees:  
 
Hypothesis 1a: The likelihood that an invention is successfully licensed is enhanced by the 
presence and scope of patents related to the invention.  
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Hypothesis 1b: Patents have a stronger effect on the likelihood of licensing to a foreign firm 
than on the likelihood of licensing to a domestic firm.  
Hypothesis 1c: Patents have a stronger effect on the likelihood of licensing to an external 
licensee than on the likelihood of licensing to an inventor spin-off.  
 
We furthermore expect that licensing is affected by the time that a potential licensee 
learns about a nascent academic invention. Collaborative inventions based on joint research 
projects with private-sector partners appear particularly relevant in this context. Industry 
involvement at an early stage of research is likely to mitigate information asymmetries and 
problems of knowledge transfer. Joint research projects with industry partners presuppose 
some relevant prior knowledge of the industry partner, and ongoing communication of 
knowledge between both partners. They should therefore increase the industry partner’s 
capability to evaluate the potential of inventions made in the project. If their assessment of the 
technology is low, industry partners may withdraw from cooperations even before inventions 
are arrived at, which should increase the average quality of inventions based on collaborative 
research. In addition, familiarity with the inventor helps build trust, enhancing the industry 
partner’s willingness to close a licensing deal in the absence of fully symmetric information. 
Since the importance of collaboration should increase with the extent of information 
asymmetry, foreign and external licensees should benefit more than domestic licensees 
respectively spin-offs. These considerations lead us to the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Academic inventions from collaborative research with industry partners are 
more likely to be licensed than other inventions.  
Hypothesis 2b: Prior collaboration has a stronger effect on the likelihood of licensing to a 
foreign firm than on the likelihood of licensing to a domestic firm.  
Hypothesis 2c: Prior collaboration has a stronger effect on the likelihood of licensing to an 
external licensee than on the likelihood of licensing to an inventor spin-off.  
 
As pointed out by Lowe (2002), the expected positive effect of collaborative research 
on the likelihood of licensing might be mitigated if in the process of collaboration industry 
partners acquired sufficient knowledge of the invention to render subsequent licensing 
unnecessary. However, this presupposes that the firm is able to design its innovation around 
the public partner’s intellectual property rights, or that the public partner is unable to enforce 
them. We therefore expect that the positive effect of collaboration more than compensates for 
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the negative effect suggested by Lowe. Furthermore, if Max Planck researchers 
predominantly collaborated with domestic incumbents, composition effects might dampen the 
differences across licensee types conjectured in Hypotheses 2b and 2c.  
 Finally, we expect that inventor seniority affects the likelihood of concluding a 
licensing agreement as well as the probable type of licensee. Substantial prior empirical 
research finds positive correlations between inventive output and the quantity and quality of 
research output at the level of individual academic inventors (e.g., Azoulay et al., 2009; 
Breschi et al., 2008; Buenstorf, 2009). Seniority therefore signals invention quality to 
potential licensees, thus increasing the willingness of potential licensees to enter into a 
contractual agreement. The value of the signal provided by seniority should be largest when 
information asymmetry is strong, i.e. in the cases of foreign and external licensees. If 
negotiations are mediated by a technology transfer office (as is the case in our empirical 
sample), it is likely that senior scientists have more influence on their employer institution 
than more junior ones. This may further increase the likelihood of a successful licensing 
agreement. We accordingly conjecture: 
 
Hypothesis 3a: Technologies (co-) invented by senior scientists are more likely to be licensed 
than those by more junior researchers.  
Hypothesis 3b: (Co-) invention by senior scientists has a stronger effect on the likelihood of 
licensing to a foreign firm than on the likelihood of licensing to a domestic firm.  
Hypothesis 3c: (Co-) invention by senior scientists has a stronger effect on the likelihood of 
licensing to an external licensee than on the likelihood of licensing to an inventor spin-off.  
 
3.2 Commercialization of licensed technologies 
Not only the likelihood of concluding a licensing agreement, but also the likelihood of 
successfully bringing the technology to the market can be expected to differ according to 
licensee and technology characteristics. Post-agreement inventor involvement in the 
development efforts has been demonstrated to increase the likelihood of successful 
commercialization (Agrawal, 2006). If a royalty-based contract has been concluded, bringing 
the product to the market is the mutual interest of licensor and licensee (Jensen and Thursby, 
2001). Accordingly, academic inventors harm themselves if they do not cooperate in post-
licensing development efforts. They may nonetheless exert less effort than would be called for 
because of competing demands on their time, particularly when primarily motivated by the 
reward mechanisms of open science (Dasgupta and David, 1994; Stephan, 1996). Equally 
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important for successful commercialization appears their ability to communicate their 
knowledge to the licensee. Both the personal cost and the effectiveness of inventor 
engagement are expected to differ with licensee and technology characteristics. We conjecture 
that these differences affect the likelihood that a licensed academic invention can be turned 
into a commercial success.  
In the case of foreign licensees, geographic distance and language barriers complicate 
post-agreement inventor involvement. Traveling is more costly in terms of time and money, 
and the transfer of non-codified knowledge (which presupposes frequent face-to-face 
interaction) is possibly less effective if national boundaries have to be crossed. We therefore 
predict the following: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Inventions licensed to foreign firms are less likely to be commercialized 
successfully than inventions licensed to domestic firms. 
 
Spin-off licensing facilitates inventor involvement. Transfer of non-codified 
knowledge to the spin-off firm is enhanced by personal migration of the inventor and/or 
associates from her laboratory to the new firm. Even though senior Max Planck scientists do 
not normally enter the active management of spin-offs (co-) founded by them (cf. Buenstorf, 
2009), inventor-founders nonetheless have strong incentives for engaging in the spin-off’s 
development activities, and they typically assume at least consulting positions in the new 
venture. Staff members of the spin-off may moreover be able to informally contact their prior 
co-workers in the inventor’s laboratory when in need of additional knowledge. 
Commercialization activities by spin-offs are expected to benefit from the facilitated 
transfer of non-codified knowledge. In addition, given a smaller product portfolio, spin-off 
survival is typically more dependent on specific technologies than survival of established 
firms. Spin-offs consequently face stronger incentives for successful commercialization 
(Lowe and Ziedonis, 2006). They are less likely to license a technology for purely strategic 
reasons (i.e., to prevent others from using it or use it as a bargaining tool vis-à-vis 
competitors). Based on these considerations, we predict the following: 
 
Hypothesis 5: Inventions licensed to inventor spin-offs are more likely to be commercialized 
successfully than inventions licensed to external licensees. 
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Effective knowledge transfer alone clearly is not sufficient to ensure successful 
commercialization. Existing evidence on the commercialization performance of spin-offs is 
inconclusive. Counter to Hypothesis 5, Shane (2002) stipulates that spin-offs are inferior in 
commercialization because they lack the required complementary assets (Teece, 1986). 
However, for their sample of licensed inventions from the University of California system, 
Lowe and Ziedonis (2006) find neither lower commercialization odds nor lower licensing 
income for spin-off licensees. This indicates that Shane’s argument may be of secondary 
importance, lending support to the prediction of Hypothesis 5 and the stipulated relevance of 
differences in the ease of knowledge transfer for the two types of licensees.  
Turning to technology characteristics, the relationship between patent protection and 
commercialization of an academic invention is ambiguous. On the one hand, the process of 
writing a patent application forces the inventors to codify substantial parts of the knowledge 
underlying the invention. This would be expected to help subsequent licensees turn the 
invention into a commercially successful product. At the same time, the above considerations 
regarding strategic patenting to prevent competitors from exploiting an invention or to gain 
negotiating power in patent thickets suggest that patented technologies may be less likely to 
be commercialized. Based on the assumption that the challenges of knowledge transfer are 
more relevant for the commercialization of academic inventions than strategic patenting, we 
predict the following: 
 
Hypothesis 6: The presence and scope of patent protection related to an invention is 
positively related to its likelihood of commercialization.  
 
In the case of collaborative research, knowledge transfer between inventor and 
licensee is facilitated by absorptive capacities and shared understandings developed in the 
prior research activities. Pre-existing familiarity with the technology also provides the 
licensee with a speed advantage, enhancing the odds of successful commercialization 
(Markman et al., 2005). In addition, licensees that were involved in collaborative research 
leading to the licensed technology have superior information about this technology. This 
enhances their ability to decide whether to license, which increases the likelihood that 
licensed inventions can also be commercialized (the selection effect already suggested above). 
We accordingly expect a positive effect of prior collaboration on commercialization: 
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Hypothesis 7: Inventions from collaborative research with industry partners are more likely 
to result in commercially viable products and processes than others.  
 
Agrawal (2006) studies a similar issue in the U.S. context, using a sample of 124 
licensed inventions from MIT’s mechanical engineering and electrical engineering / computer 
science departments. He finds positive effects for sponsored research both on the likelihood of 
successful commercialization and on the level of revenues generated thereby. Neither effect is 
statistically significant, however.  
 Finally, the successful commercialization of a university invention may also depend 
on the seniority of the inventor(s). As with patents, two contravening effects of inventor 
seniority on the commercialization odds of academic inventions seem plausible. On the one 
hand, as argued above, prior research indicates that more successful researchers may also 
have inherently superior inventions, so seniority would be expected to be related to higher 
commercialization odds and higher royalty income. On the other hand, the more senior an 
inventor is, the higher are her opportunity costs of post-agreement involvement in the 
licensee’s development efforts. Ceteris paribus, senior scientists are therefore expected to 
spend less time on their inventions, which will lower the likelihood of successful 
commercialization. This might be particularly salient for inventions licensed to external 
licensees, as senior scientists may be more willing to spend time with their spin-off firms, the 
success of which is more relevant both to their income and their reputation. We will explore 
this conjecture below. In general, we expect that the quality effect of seniority outweighs the 
opportunity cost effect. This assumption informs our final hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 8: Technologies (co-) invented by senior scientists are more likely to be 
commercialized than inventions by more junior scientists.  
 
4. Technology transfer at the Max Planck Society 
 
Public research in Germany is characterized by a unique division of labor between 
universities and a variety of non-university public research organizations (PROs). Among the 
latter, the Max Planck Society is the largest one focussing on basic research. It currently 
employs some 4,700 researchers and receives almost 80 per cent of its budget from public, 
institutional funding (Max Planck Society, 2008). The mission of the Max Planck Society is 
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to complement the university system by taking up large-scale, interdisciplinary, or particularly 
innovative activities that are out of reach for individual universities or do not fit their 
organizational structure. To this purpose, it has established 80 individual Max Planck 
Institutes that are dispersed all over the country (plus three institutes located abroad) and 
cover the full spectrum of the sciences and the humanities. The institutes are organized into 
three sections: the biomedical section, the chemistry, physics and technology section, as well 
as the humanities and social sciences section.  
 The Max Planck Society’s internal organization is unique. Its basic strategy is to put 
its highest-level researchers, the Max Planck directors, in a particularly autonomous and 
powerful position. Their mission is research-oriented, with substantial long-term, institutional 
funding. New directors are recruited among the most successful researchers of domestic and 
foreign universities. The Max Planck Society currently has some 270 active directors.  
Until 2002, inventions made by the Max Planck Society’s employees were treated 
differently from those of German university researchers. Just as the employees of private-
sector firms, employees of the non-university PROs including the Max Planck Society have 
always been subject to the Arbeitnehmererfindungsgesetz. This law on employee inventions 
mandates that employees must disclose all inventions to their employer, and assigns the 
property rights in these inventions to the employer.1 As a consequence, the Max Planck 
Society can claim ownership in the invention, in which case it applies for patents (for suitable 
technologies) and organizes the negotiation and administration of licensing agreements. In the 
case of successful commercialization, the inventor receives 30 per cent of all revenues from 
licenses and patent sales.  
 Our empirical analysis exploits the fact that the Max Planck Society owned the 
inventions of its researchers already before 2002. We use information about inventions and 
licensing agreements provided by Max Planck Innovation GmbH, the Max Planck Society’s 
legally independent technology transfer subsidiary. Max Planck Innovation was organized in 
1970, originally under the name Garching Innovation. After some early attempts of 
constructing and marketing prototypes based on Max Planck inventions, for the past three 
decades it has focused on patenting and licensing activities. Disclosure of inventions is 
actively solicited at the individual institutes. Patents are applied for if the invention is 
patentable and considered sufficiently promising, even if no licensee for the technology has 
                                                 
1 In contrast, before the so-called Hochschullehrerprivileg or “professors’ privilege” was abolished in 2002, 
university researchers were exempt from the law and retained the intellectual property in their inventions (cf. von 
Ledebur et al., 2009). 
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been identified.2 Technologies are marketed to both domestic and foreign firms. Systematic 
support and counseling of spin-off activities was taken up in the early 1990s, and spin-off 
numbers have strongly increased since then. Overall licensing income contributes about 1 per 
cent to the Max Planck Society’s annual budget (Max Planck Society, 2008).  
 
5. Dataset and econometric approach 
 
5.1 Sources 
This study is primarily based on two sets of data made available by Max Planck Innovation. 
The first dataset contains all inventions disclosed by Max Planck researchers from the early 
1970s to 2004.3 In total, it encompasses 3,012 inventions. 1,885 resulted in at least one patent 
application.4 The database includes the title of the invention, names and institute affiliations 
of the inventors, day of disclosure and (if eligible) patent application, as well as information 
regarding further use of the invention.  
We matched these data with a second dataset assembled from Max Planck 
Innovation’s licensing agreements. 864 inventions (614 patented inventions) have been 
licensed, and because non-exclusive contracts may have multiple licensees, there are in total 
1,172 licensing agreements. A substantial number of licensing agreements cover more than a 
single invention. These were treated as individual contracts for the corresponding inventions 
because we are interested in the commercial potential of individual inventions. Payments from 
these agreements (if any) were split equally between the involved inventions. We control for 
this “license bundling” in the subsequent empirical analysis. 
For each contract, information is available about the licensee name and address, the 
dates when the agreement was concluded and (possibly) terminated, contractual arrangements 
regarding fixed fees and royalties, as well as actual dates and amounts of payments as of 
2007. As academic inventions are mostly licensed within a few years after their invention, 
restricting the sample to pre-2005 inventions while including payments through 2007 
minimizes right censoring issues. Max Planck technologies are similar to other academic 
                                                 
2 In this regard, Max Planck Innovation’s patenting policy thus appears to be closer to that of the MIT than that 
of the UC system (cf. Shane, 2002; Lowe and Ziedonis, 2006) 
3 Researchers employed on a scholarship basis, mostly Ph.D. students and international postdocs, are not subject 
to the German law on employee inventions (Arbeitnehmererfindungsgesetz). To the extent that these individuals 
made inventions without other Max Planck researchers being involved, they do not show up in the data. 
4 In 141 cases, no patent information was found even though the inventions database identified them as patented. 
We suspect that most of these cases reflect cancelled applications. They are treated as not being patented in the 
subsequent analysis. 
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inventions in that payments (in particular, royalties) are extremely skewed. A single Max 
Planck invention in the sample accounts for more than 75 % of the overall returns.  
Patent data are used to control for heterogeneity in the quality of inventions. Our 
primary proxy for patent quality is the number of members in the patent family. It indicates 
the geographical scope of the IPR protection sought by the patent application and is a widely 
accepted measure of patent quality (Harhoff et al., 2003). In addition, we include a dummy 
variable indicating applications in the three most important economic regions. These “triadic” 
patent families indicate applications at the European Patent Office and its Japanese and U.S. 
counterparts. We also experimented with the number of IPC classes and granted patents in the 
family as quality indicators, but they were less predictive and so we did not pursue these 
experiments further. To obtain the patent information, we conducted a patent family search in 
Depatisnet, the publicly available patent search site of the German Patent Office (DPMA), 
using the patent applications listed in the Max Planck Innovation invention database as our 
point of departure. This yielded some 10,000 documents for all inventions since the early 
1970s. These documents were stored in a separate database preserving the original patent 
family structure. Subsequently, they were linked to the invention dataset. 
We restrict our empirical analysis to the 2,392 inventions disclosed in or after 1980. 
Earlier inventions are excluded for three reasons. First, the earliest entries in the inventions 
dataset are not consistently inventions by Max Planck researchers, since at the time Garching 
Innovation was offering its services to a variety of other PROs and even some commercial 
firms, whose inventions then show up in our data. Second, the quality of the earliest data was 
below that related to later inventions. Third, systematic support of spin-off activities out of the 
Max Planck Society only began around 1990, and even though spin-off activities can be 
found before, they were of little import in the earliest years of the data. Another 141 
inventions had to be dropped because of non-availability of data. Accordingly, the final 
dataset used in the empirical analyses contains 2,251 inventions, 1,382 of which have been 
patented (Table 1a).  
 
5.2 Variables 
Three dependent variables are used in the subsequent models. First, we study whether or not 
an invention was licensed. Licensing can readily be inferred from the existence of a licensing 
agreement. 721 (32 per cent) of all inventions disclosed after 1980 have been included in a 
licensing agreement. This number is comparable to U.S. institutions studied before. For 
example, Lowe and Ziedonis (2006) study 734 licensing deals closed by the UC system 
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between 1981 and 1999. Second, we are interested in the factors conditioning successful 
commercialization. While this information is not directly contained in the data, we derive it 
from the existence of positive royalty payments. Of course, this restricts the sample for 
studying commercialization to those inventions where licensing agreements provided for 
royalty payments (not only fixed fees). In the post-1980 sample, there are 729 cases of this 
kind, of which 365 (50 per cent) have resulted in positive royalties (Table 1b). Third, we are 
concerned about the distribution of returns from these contracts. We have data on yearly 
payments from individual contracts until 2007. Since they are highly skewed we analyze the 
log of cumulative royalty payments, eliminating outliers in some analyses as a robustness 
check. 
As central explanatory variables, the analysis uses four indicator variables identifying, 
respectively, foreign licensees, spin-off licensees, collaborative inventions, and senior 
inventors. To study effects of international licensing, licensees were classified into domestic 
versus foreign according to the postal address given in the data. Accordingly, German 
branches and subsidiaries of foreign companies are classified as German licensees. This is in 
line with our primary interest in potential difficulties arising from information asymmetries 
and the transfer of non-codified knowledge, which we expect to depend more on the 
licensee’s physical location than on whether or not the licensee is foreign-owned. 
International license agreements are widespread in the Max Planck Society. Of the 1,033 
(729)5 license agreements for inventions disclosed since 1980, 349 (241) are with foreign 
licensees. Spin-offs among the licensees were identified on the basis of Max Planck 
Innovation’s spin-off database. There are 236 (198) cases of licenses to spin-offs in the 
sample. 
Collaborative inventions are identified on the basis of patent applications. We define 
as collaborative all inventions that were not exclusively assigned to the Max Planck Society 
(i.e., those assigned either to the Max Planck Society and a private-sector firm, or exclusively 
assigned to a private-sector firm). Their total number is 133 (73).6 Finally, senior scientist 
involvement is proxied by technologies (co-) invented by one or (in rare cases) several Max 
Planck directors, which is justified by the distinctive position directors have in the Max 
Planck hierarchy. We identified the directors using published sources (Henning and Ullmann, 
                                                 
5 Numbers in parentheses refer to the subset of agreements providing for royalty payments that were actually 
analyzed to test the hypotheses related to commercialization. 
6 Patent ownership is a restrictive measure of collaborative invention (Fontana and Geuna, 2009), which is 
reflected by the comparatively small number of collaborative inventions we thus identified. We alternatively 
considered using information about collaboration from the Max Planck Innovation invention database. However, 
since the database is updated regularly and we do not have information about when the collaboration information 
was entered, we did not use it in the analysis based on endogeneity concerns. 
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1998; Max Planck Society, 2000) and information provided by the Max Planck Society’s 
human resource department. We identify 381 (279) cases of director involvement.  
 A set of control variables is used. Existence and quality of patents related to an 
invention is proxied by patent application and patent family size. Moreover, we apply a 
dummy variable for “triadic” patents (patent application in the EU, the U.S. and Japan) 
indicating inventions that are perceived to be valuable worthy of broad protection. We further 
control for discipline-specific factors with a dummy variable denoting inventions from the 
biomedical section. This dummy is zero for inventions from the chemistry, physics and 
technology section.7 Controls are also included for the top five institutes in terms of the 
number of disclosed inventions. Time effects are captured by an integer variable denoting the 
year of disclosure of the invention and starting with “0” in 1980 (the first year of our 
analyses). Finally, in the analyses of commercialization, we also include dummies denoting 
all licensing agreements involving repeat licensees that show up more than once in the full 
database, as well as cases where a “bundle” of multiple inventions was licensed to the same 
licensee (cf. the above discussion). Descriptive statistics and correlations between the 
independent variables are given in Tables 2a-b through 4a-b. 
 
5.3 Methods  
Multinomial logit models are employed to analyze the likelihood that a given invention was 
licensed to a specific type of licensee. We estimate two sets of models, with the alternative 
outcomes being, respectively, licensing to a domestic versus foreign licensee, or licensing to 
an external licensee versus an inventor spin-off. (No licensing is the reference outcome in 
both sets of models.) 
The likelihood of successful commercialization is studied in three steps. First, we 
estimate a set of logit models with commercialization as the dependent variable, using the set 
of licensing agreements as our sample, and estimating standard errors clustered by invention 
to account for multiple licensing. As noted above, commercialization is defined as the 
existence of positive royalty payments. Obviously, this restricts the sample to the subset of 
licensing agreements that contain provisions providing for royalty payments. Second, we also 
analyze the commercial success of licensed technologies using the amount of royalties as the 
dependent variable. Since royalties are highly skewed we employ natural logarithms of this 
                                                 
7 There are a handful of inventions that cannot be assigned to one of these sections, mostly because they were 
disclosed by staff of the Max Planck Society’s general administration or have been assigned to an institute 
outside the Max Planck Society (e. g., the Helmholtz Society). These inventions have been dropped from the 
analysis.  
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variable. Royalties are censored at zero, which we take into consideration by estimating Tobit 
models. 
A shortcoming of both approaches is that they do not account for selection effects: 
Technologies licensed to different kinds of licensees may differ in their characteristics, and 
these differences may affect their subsequent commercialization odds. Our analysis of 
licensing indicates that there are indeed substantial differences between the technologies 
licensed to different kinds of firms, which suggests that selection into the different kinds of 
licensing contracts (domestic versus foreign, spin-off versus external) is not random.  
To test whether differences in the commercialization likelihood of different types of 
licensees are due to differences in observables affecting selection into licensee types, we 
interpret specific kinds of licensing agreements as treatments, and estimate how being treated 
affected the commercialization likelihood using propensity score matching (Rosenbloom and 
Rubin, 1983; Heckman et al., 1998; cf. also Sianesi, 2001; Wooldridge, 2002, ch. 18). 
Specifically, two propensity score matching estimators are employed: in the first one, the 
treatment consists in being licensed to a foreign licensee. In the second one, licensing to a 
spin-off is the treatment. 
The intuition underlying propensity score matching is as follows. In non-experimental 
data, for each observation only one outcome (here: commercialization success) is observed. If 
Yi0 denotes observation i’s outcome without treatment, Yi1 denotes observation i’s outcome 
with treatment, and T∈ {0, 1} denotes treatment, we would like to know the treatment effect 
Yi1 – Yi0, but can only observe one of the two outcomes. If selection into treatment is 
nonrandom, the effect of treatment on the outcome cannot be separated from the selection 
effect in the data. 
Propensity score matching uses the available information on individual observations to 
generate a counterfactual control group from the untreated observations, such that differences 
in observable characteristics are minimized between the treated observations and the members 
of the control group. The basic approach is to calculate the probability of receiving treatment 
for each observation based on its observable characteristics, using probit or logit models. This 
conditional probability is the propensity score, which is then used for matching the treated 
observations to similar non-treated ones. Under the assumption that selection into treatment 
only depends on observables, the average effect of treatment can then be estimated at the 
population level. Specifically, both the average treatment effect (ATE), E(Yi1 – Yi0), and the 
average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), E(Yi1 – Yi0 | T = 1), can be estimated.  
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Various propensity score-based matching methods have been proposed. When large 
samples of non-treated observations are available, each treated observation can be matched to 
an “identical twin,” i.e. a non-treated observation that is very similar in its propensity score, 
and the outcomes of both observations are then compared. Alternatively, each treated 
observation can be matched to a weighted average of untreated observations, where the 
weights are determined by how similar the propensity scores of the untreated observations are 
to that of the treated one. We adopt the latter approach below. We report results obtained by 
estimating propensity scores with logit models, using a Gaussian kernel for matching, where 
the weights of the untreated observations follow a normal distribution around the propensity 
score of the respective treated one. The estimations were performed using the psmatch2 
routine for Stata 9.0 (Leuven and Sianesi, 2003).  
 
6. Results 
 
6.1 Likelihood of licensing 
Models 1-3 (Table 5) analyze how licensing to domestic versus foreign licensees is related to 
characteristics of the technology as well as its inventors, and the corresponding Models 4-6 
(Table 6) analyze the same issue for inventor spin-off versus external licensees.  
We find that patented inventions are more likely to be licensed to either type of 
licensee, and that among the patented inventions family size enhances the likelihood of 
licensing, both of which is consistent with Hypothesis 1a. Counter to Hypothesis 1b, the 
estimated effects of patent protection are very similar for domestic and foreign licensees. As 
regards Hypothesis 1c, we even find that the likelihood of licensing by spin-offs is more 
strongly related to the presence of patent applications (p < 0.002 in Models 4 and 5) than the 
likelihood of licensing to external licensees. This runs counter to our expectations. A possible 
explanation might be that ambitious inventor spin-offs are critically dependent on external 
financing by venture capitalists and access to capital is facilitated by a strong IPR position. 
Our findings suggest that this effect may be stronger than the conjectured role of information 
asymmetries.  
Since our proxy for collaborative inventions is patent-based, the conjectured 
relationship to the likelihood of licensing can only be tested for the restricted sample of 
patented inventions. The results indicate that information asymmetry may not be the major 
factor explaining differences between collaborative and other inventions, as there are no 
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significant positive effects of the collaboration variable on licensing of any type. At the same 
time, counter to the “skimming” argument put forward by Lowe (2002) we find no evidence 
that collaborative inventions in general are less often licensed than others. One possibility is 
that both effects compensate each other: selection enabled by better information may be 
counteracting the effect of reduced difficulty in negotiating, and only the most promising 
technologies from collaborative research are actually licensed. We furthermore find that 
collaborative inventions are less likely to be licensed to foreign firms, which may reflect 
composition effects in the partners of collaboration. In line with Hypothesis 3c, collaboration 
affects licensing by external licensees more favorably than by spin-offs (for spin-offs a 
marginally significant negative coefficient is estimated; and the difference between the 
coefficients is significant at p < 0.02.).  
 Inventor seniority is positively related to the likelihood of licensing across all licensee 
types, consistent with Hypothesis 3a. As regards the nationality of licensees, differences in the 
effects of seniority are small and insignificant, while counter to Hypothesis 2c seniority seems 
to play an even bigger role for spin-offs than for external licensing. This may reflect a 
stronger willingness of senior researchers to engage in entrepreneurial activities compared to 
licensing to outsiders.  
 Finally, two regularities related to the control variables are noteworthy. First, later 
inventions are less likely to be licensed both to domestic and to foreign licensees. This seems 
to reflect higher aspiration levels of potential licensees and/or decreasing average quality of 
inventions. An alternative explanation might be right censoring issues, but experiments 
replacing the time variable by a set of three cohort dummies found that inventions disclosed 
1990-97 already were less likely to be licensed than earlier ones. (The results are available 
from the authors.) We also see that spin-off licensing is gaining in importance over time, 
which resonates with what we know about academic spin-offs from the Max Planck Society 
as well as German universities and PROs more generally. Second, inventions from the 
biomedical section are more likely to be licensed to foreign licensees, possibly reflecting 
more developed markets for technology in this field and/or the sectoral structure of the 
German economy. While spin-offs also appear more likely to license biomedical inventions 
than external licensees, this difference is not significant and further decreases with the 
inclusion of institute controls and patent quality indicators. 
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6.2 Likelihood of commercialization 
Three alternative approaches are employed to identify potential factors influencing the 
likelihood that licensed inventions are successfully commercialized. Odds of 
commercialization are first analyzed using logit models (Models 7-12 in Table 7), with 
successful commercialization measured by an indicator variable denoting licensing 
agreements that led to positive royalty payments. Second, the logged amount of royalties is 
adopted as an alternative measure of commercial success (Models 13-18 in Table 8.) We 
finally consider potential effects of non-random selection into licensee types using propensity 
score matching (Table 9).   
As predicted by Hypothesis 4, the results of the logit models indicate that foreign 
licensees are significantly less likely to commercialize a licensed technology. They thus lend 
support to the conjecture that international knowledge transfer causes problems hindering the 
successful development of university technologies. Less conclusive evidence is obtained for 
the level of royalty payments, where the variable denoting foreign licensees is significant only 
in Models 17 and 18 that are restricted to patented inventions and exclude outliers. 
Furthermore, propensity score matching (Model 19 in Table 9) indicates that selection may 
account for the lower commercialization chances of inventions licensed to foreigners.8 
Without matching, the commercialization likelihood of technologies licensed to foreign firm 
is 7.9 percentage points lower than that of technologies licensed within Germany. Comparing 
the technologies licensed to foreigners with similar technologies licensed at home reduces this 
difference to 5.8 percentage points, which is not significantly different from zero. This 
suggests that the observable disadvantage of technologies licensed abroad is in part due to 
selection, while the remaining difference may not be systematic.9 
 All three methods do not yield evidence suggesting that spin-off licensees 
significantly differ from external licensees in their likelihood to commercialize inventions or 
in the level of royalties. We therefore reject Hypothesis 5, which predicted that due to easier 
knowledge transfer and/or stronger incentives spin-offs should be more successful 
commercializers. At the same time, we also do not find that spin-offs are inherently inferior to 
established firms as commercializers.  
                                                 
8 To obtain propensity scores, a logit model for the likelihood of being licensed to a foreign licensee was 
estimated first. We use a specification similar to Model 10 but adding patent family size (set equal to zero for 
unpatented inventions) while excluding the non-predictive dummy for triadic patents. Kernel-based matching of 
treated and untreated observations was then adopted (cf. also section 5). 
9 If the whole population of licensed technologies is considered, the average effect of treatment is 13.6 percent, 
which is significant at the 5% level. 
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Of all independent variables, the clearest pattern of evidence emerges for the patent 
variable. The dummy variable denoting inventions related to patent applications is sizable and 
strongly negative in all models, indicating that these inventions had lower commercialization 
chances than unpatented technologies. In contrast, the proxies for patent quality are non-
predictive throughout. As regards collaborative inventions, we obtain positive coefficient 
estimates for both commercialization likelihood and levels of royalties, but these are mostly 
only marginally significant at the 10%-level. 
The seniority variable denoting Max Planck directors among the inventors of a 
technology has no discernible impact on commercialization success. In light of the substantial 
effects of seniority found above in the analysis of licensing, we decided to probe its effect 
further, in particular allowing for the effect of seniority to differ between inventions licensed 
to spin-offs versus external licensees. To this purpose we replaced the overlapping dummy 
variables denoting spin-off licensees and director-inventors by three separate, non-
overlapping interactions denoting, respectively, director-inventions licensed to spin-offs, other 
inventions licensed to spin-offs, and director-inventions licensed to external licensees (Model 
10). The results indicate that even with this more fine-grained classification, differences in 
commercialization chances relative to the control group of non-director inventions licensed to 
external licensees are not significantly different from zero. The largest difference is found 
between the two types of director-invented technologies, where those licensed to external 
licensees are marginally more likely to be commercialized than those licensed to spin-offs (p 
< 0.10). However, in the other models using the same distinction (Model 12 restricted to 
patented inventions, as well as Models 16 and 18 studying levels of royalty), no systematic 
differences across the licensees of inventions by senior researchers can be identified.  
Finally, it is worthwhile to point out that in all models, later inventions are 
systematically less often commercialized and yield systematically lower royalties than earlier 
ones. Again, we replaced the time variable by three cohort dummies to control for the 
possibility that the decline in commercial success is due to right censoring of the data. The 
(unreported) results show that in terms of commercialization likelihood, the first and second 
cohorts (pre-1990 and 1990-97 inventions) are more different than the second and the third, 
which would not be expected if the variation was mostly due to right censoring. Therefore, we 
cannot rule out that the difference in commercialization odds between older and younger 
inventions indeed reflects a decreasing trend in the commercial values of Max Plank 
inventions.  
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7. Discussion 
 
Technology transfer activities from public research are increasingly embraced by policy 
makers, the management of universities and PROs, and also by (many of) the researchers 
themselves. Public research is also highlighted as a key component of interactive innovation 
processes in the systems of innovation literature (cf. Lundvall, 1988; Nelson, 1993; Malerba, 
2002). However, we only have limited micro-level evidence on the interrelations between 
public research and private-sector innovation, in particular with regard to countries outside the 
U.S. This evidence would be instrumental to better understand and govern science-based 
innovation activities. 
We know that academic inventions are typically in an early development stage (Jensen 
and Thursby, 2001). As a consequence, they are not available “off the shelf” for private-sector 
licensees, but ongoing direct interaction and inventor engagement is crucial to turn them into 
commercially viable products. This characterizes technology “transfer” as an interactive 
process, which  resonates with the evolutionary, non-linear conception of innovation 
processes (Kline and Rosenberg, 1986; Cohen et al., 2002; Nelson, 2004). 
 In the present article, we studied technology transfer through licensing of inventions 
from a major European non-university PRO, Germany’s Max Planck Society. Due to 
peculiarities in the treatment of academic inventions in Germany before 2002, data on the 
incidence and success of technology licensing from the Max Planck Society are available for 
an exceptionally long period of time. These data inform our econometric analysis, which 
covers the full population of Max Planck inventions and licenses for the 1980-2003 period 
and takes into consideration that only the selected subset of licensed technologies is actually 
at risk of being commercialized. 
To guide the analysis, we derived a number of testable hypotheses using the notion of 
“cognitive distance” (Nooteboom, 1999) between academic inventors and private-sector 
licensees as our conceptual point of departure. When inventors know different things from 
what (potential) licensees know, the ensuing problems of asymmetric information may 
prevent the parties from agreeing on a mutually acceptable licensing agreement. We further 
conjectured that because the inventors’ knowledge is not fully codified but partially tacit or at 
least “latent” (Agrawal, 2006), i.e. codifiable but not actually codified, problems of 
communication and knowledge transfer may ensue even when incentive problems have been 
solved. The larger the “distance” in the knowledge of inventors and (actual) licensees, the 
more difficult we would expect the commercialization of academic inventions to be. 
23
 #0920 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Our empirical results are consistent with a substantial impact of “cognitive distance” 
on licensing incidence and success. We find that inventor spin-offs are indistinguishable from 
external licensees both in their likelihood of commercializing academic inventions and in the 
level of royalties they generate from product sales. This suggests that deeper understanding of 
the technology by the inventor spin-off may compensate for expected disadvantages from 
inferior organizational capabilities as well as lacking complementary assets. It qualifies earlier 
arguments that spin-off licensing may be a second-best outcome (Shane, 2002). 
We found that foreign licensees were less frequent than domestic ones. Prima facie 
evidence indicated they also were less successful as commercializers of academic inventions, 
even though this difference partially reflects non-random selection into licensing by 
foreigners and was found not to be systematic using propensity score matching. 
Technologies (co-) invented by senior scientists are more likely to be licensed, while 
we find no evidence that they are less likely to be commercialized than those of less senior 
researchers. This suggests that the quality signal provided by inventor seniority effectively 
enhances the likelihood of concluding a licensing agreement. It moreover suggests that the 
signal is valid, as the higher likelihood of licensing does not lower the chances of success. 
Inventions based on collaborative research (narrowly defined by joint patent applications or 
patents owned by private firms) tend to be more successfully licensed, but our measure of 
collaboration restricts the sample to the patented inventions and the estimated coefficients are 
only marginally significant.   
At the same time, some of our findings suggest that information asymmetry and 
knowledge transfer cannot fully account for the observable differences in licensing and 
commercialization. The role of patents is noteworthy in this regard. Both the existence of 
patent applications and their scope are related to a strongly higher likelihood that the 
technology is licensed, which is consistent with patents reducing the relevance of asymmetric 
information. However, counter to expectations, foreign licensing is not affected more strongly 
by patents than domestic licensing, whereas spin-off licensing is more strongly related to 
patents than external licensing. Even more surprisingly, inventions related to patents are less 
likely to be commercialized than others. These patterns suggest that patents play a more 
complex role than just reducing information asymmetry and facilitating knowledge transfer 
through partial codification. In particular, the apparent importance of patents for spin-off 
licensees may reflect that spin-off entrepreneurs need IPR to attract external financing.  
The empirical analysis of license-based transfer activities from the Max Planck thus 
shows that the patterns of licensing and commercialization are complex. Further theoretical 
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and empirical work is required to better understand the process through which academic 
inventions are turned into commercial success stories. Obviously, the generality of our results 
is limited because the analysis only covered a single organization, which moreover follows a 
dedicated mission to focus on basic research. However, the Max Planck Society was among 
the pioneers of IPR-based technology transfer in Europe, consistently subject to the Bayh-
Dole-like IPR regime that is increasingly adopted also for the governance of European 
university inventions. On the one hand, this institutional development toward the kind of IPR 
regime that underlies our results enhances their relevance. On the other hand, over time it will 
allow for an increasing number of studies to improve our knowledge about technology 
licensing, knowledge transfer and innovation based on public research.  
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Table 1a: Inventions disclosed by Max Planck researchers, 1980-2005 
Inventions 
(patented) 
2,251 
1,382 
Licensed inventions 
(patented) 
721 
529 
First licensed to foreign firm 
(patented) 
184 
132 
First licensed to spinoffs 
(patented) 
195 
165 
 
 
Table 1b: License agreements with royalties by Max Planck researchers, 1980-2005 
Contracts 
(patented) 
729 
504 
Commercialized 
(patented) 
365 
212 
 
 
Table 2a: Descriptive statistics I (Inventions) 
All inventions 
(2251) 
Patented Inventions 
(1382) 
 
(mean) (min) (max) (mean) (min) (max) 
Director-inventor .133 0 1 .179 0 1 
Biomedical section .601 0 1 .591 0 1 
Patent application .634 0 1 -- -- -- 
Time (1980 = 0) 14.648 0 25 14.371 0 24 
Patent family size -- -- -- 5.431 1 120 
Triadic Patent Family -- -- -- .250 0 1 
Collaborative invention  -- -- -- .211 0 1 
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Table 2b: Descriptive statistics II (licensed inventions) 
License contracts providing for 
royalties (729) 
Licensing contracts providing for 
royalties (patented) (504) 
 
(mean) (min) (max) (mean) (min) (max) 
Commercialization .501 0 1 .421 0 1 
Ln variable payments 4.782 0 19.109 4.131 0 19.109 
Director-inventor .383 0 1 .433 0 1 
Biomedical section .765 0 1 .792 0 1 
Foreign Licensee .331 0 1 .317 0 1 
Spin-off Licensee .272 0 1 .321 0 1 
Time (1980 = 0) 13.36 0 25 13.467 0 24 
Bundle .287 0 1 .361 0 1 
Repeat licensee .757 0 1 .819 0 1 
Patent application .697 0 1 -- -- -- 
Patent family size -- -- -- 9.032 1 74 
Collaborative invention  -- -- -- .145 0 1 
 
 
Table 3a: Correlations between covariates I (all inventions) 
2251 obs. Time Biomed Dir. Involvem. Patent 
Time 1.000    
Biomed .083 1.000   
Director Involvement .028 .170 1.000  
Patent -.014 -.008 .162 1.000 
 
 
Table 3b: Correlations between covariates II (patented inventions) 
1382 obs. Time Biomed Director 
Involvem. 
Patent 
Family 
Triadic Pat. 
Family 
Industry 
Cooperation 
Time 1.000      
Biomed .087 1.000     
Director Involvement .036 .200 1.000    
Patent Family -.051 .148 ..221 1.000   
Triadic Patent Family -.224 -.037 .137 .446 1.000  
Industry Cooperation .052 -.123 -.028 .111 .194 1.000 
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Table 4a: Correlations between covariates III (all licensed inventions) 
729 obs. Foreign Spinoff Time Biomed Dir. Inv.. Patent Bundle M. Lic. 
Foreign 1.000        
Spinoff -.193 1.000       
Time -.016 .255 1.000      
Biomed .196 .091 .183 1.000     
Dir. Involvement .149 .255 .125 .209 1.000    
Patent -.044 .175 .022 .086 .157 1.000   
Bundle -.039 .268 -.006 .029 .194 .253 1.000  
Repeat licencee -.126 .238 .030 .140 .163 .218 .338 1.000 
 
 
Table 4b: Correlations between covariates IV (patented licensed inventions) 
504 obs.. For. Spin. Time Biom. Dir. 
Inv. 
Pat. 
Fam. 
Triade Ind. 
Coop. 
Bund. Mult. 
Lic. 
Foreign 1.000          
Spinoff -.186 1.000         
Time -.117 .230 1.000        
Biomed .120 .123 .217 1.000       
Director 
Involvement 
.076 .291 .112 .162 1.000      
Patent Family .219 -.079 -.110 .155 .168 1.000     
Triadic Patent 
Family 
.103 -.044 -.203 -.038 .004 .446 1.000    
Industry 
Cooperation 
-.123 -.042 .030 -.080 -.098 .028 .128 1.000   
Bundle -.060 .234 -.069 -.031 .152 .214 .198 .066 1.000  
Repeat licencee -.212 .224 .024 .115 .118 .128 .115 .061 .331 1.000 
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Table 9: Likelihood of commercialization (propensity score matching) 
Model 19 (foreign vs. domestic) Model 20 (spin-off vs. external)  
Unmatched ATT ATE Unmatched ATT ATE 
Treated .448 .448  .383 .383  
Untreated .526 .506  .442 .327  
Difference -.079 -.058 -.136 -.059 .055 -.017 
S.E. (bootstrapped)  .045 .044  .056 .056 
 -.134 -.224  -.082 -.113 95% Confid. interval 
(bias corrected)  .049 -.055  .152 .123 
Note: Kernel matching (Gaussian kernel; bandwidth = .06); standard errors obtained through 
bootstrapping (n = 100) 
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